Teaching AI Agent to Play Poker Strategically Through Preference Optimization
arXiv:2610.27028v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A poker agent can make a legal move and still make a strategically poor one. We ask whether compact AI agents can exhibit strategic behavior under hidden information and whether preference optimization can improve beyond static and zero-shot policies. We first evaluate a static baseline and three frozen language models: SmallThinker, Qwen3, and Gemma-3 whose performance varies substantially between exact-game and six-player evaluation. We therefore propose Strategic Preference Optimization with KL-anchored Equilibrium (SPOKE), combining teacher-r
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